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This is our hair-splitting machine... Some of us are able to split the
splinter of a split hair again into 999,999 parts. The champion receives
as a special prize a wreath fashioned out of the hairs he has split.'
INSTEAD OF a satire on legal conceptualism, Von Jhering might well
have been writing a suitable prologue to the present struggle in the fed-
eral courts concerning the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result
of wire-tapping.2 In this struggle which has spanned a quarter of a cen-
tury, the central figure is section 605 of the Communications Act of
1934,, and its interpretation.
1. Von Jhering, In the Heaven of Legal Concepts, in COHEN & COHEN, READINGS
IN JURIsPRUDENcE AND LEGAL PHmOSoPHy 678, 682 (1953).
2. On December 9, 1957, two wire-tapping decisions were made by the Supreme
Court: Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, and Rathbun v. United States, 355
U.S. 107. The former was a unanimous decision, the latter contained the dissent of
two Justices, in which many of the distinctions in the interpretation of the terms of
§ 605 are pointed out.




As an evidentiary problem, the admissibility of wire-tap evidence in
the federal courts is an outgrowth of the Weeks4 case, in which the Su-
preme Court formulated the present federal exclusionary rule, making
evidence illegally obtained by federal agents inadmissible in the federal
courts. Specifically, it was held that evidence obtained in violation of
the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure of the fourth
amendment could not be introduced.
The wire-tapping controversy made its debut in the federal courts in
1928, in Olmstead v. United States,5 although five years earlier, in the
court of appeals, such evidence was admitted without question.6 In the
Olmstead case, it was decided that wire-tapping did not constitute a search
or seizure, and was therefore not within the purview of the fourth
amendment. Over the vigorous dissents of Justices Holmes and
Brandeis,7 it was concluded that wire-tap evidence was admissible in the
federal courts.
The law remained dear for the next six years,8 until Congress enacted
Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934:9
... No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept a com-
munication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, pur-
port, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person....
The obvious intendment of Congress was to alleviate the problem created
by the decision in the Olmstead case. It was an attempt to legislate
secrecy into the field of telephone communications. Unfortunately, the
language of the present section was lifted from the Radio Act of 1927
- language which is applicable to radio communications, but was never
intended to be applied to telephones.10
4. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
6. Wallace v. United States, 291 Fed. 972 (6th Cir. 1923).
7. Justice Holmes characterized wire-tapping by government agents a "dirty busi-
ness." 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928). Justice Brandeis looked upon it as "a greater
instrument of tyranny and oppression than writs of assistance and general warrants."
277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928).
8. Wire-tap evidence was held admissible in Kerns v. United States, 50 F.2d 602
(6th Cir. 1931); Morton v. United States 60 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1932); Foley v.
United States, 64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1933), cert. deinkd, 289 U.S. 762 (1933). And
this was true even though the wire-tap was performed in violation of state laws pro-
hibiting such conduct. Morton v. United States, supra.; Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928). To tie up any loose ends, it was decided in the Foley case,
supra., that a search warrant issued on the basis of wire-tap evidence was valid.
9. 48 Star 1103 (1934),47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).
10. Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F.2d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 1938).
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In this historical context, Section 605 became the springboard from
which the courts immediately plunged into the race for Von Jhering's
"wreath of hair."
THE RACE IS ON
Though Section 605 is worded with comparative simplicity, the
courts appear to be groping in the dark in an effort to define its terms
and interpret them suitably. Several terms of the section have attained
unusual notoriety because of their propensity to induce "hair-splitting."
intercept
Paramount among these terms is "intercept," which has led to endless
interpretation, re-interpretation and discord. In the leading case on this
point, "interception" was defined as breaking-in between the sender and
the recipient; to record a conversation at the ecipient's telephone con-
stituted a recording at the end of the line, and not an "interception."'1
However, in a recent case,12 the recipient recorded the conversation, but
he made the fatal mistake of attaching the device to the bell box of the
telephone, a point "between the lips of the sender and the ear of the
recipient."I5 The court, having determined that Section 605 prohibits
an interception even by the recipient, held that this conduct constituted
an "interception," and the evidence was ruled out as inadmissible.
However, there has been some consistency in the decisions, if only
in their naked words. The courts have repeatedly concluded that the
mandate of Section 605 applies to a conversation only while it is being
transmitted over the wire.14  The disagreement is in the determination
as to when the message enters or leaves the "protected" area. Where
a detectaphone was attached to a wall in another room and used to over-
hear telephone conversations carried on in the "wired" room, there was
no "interception." The court reasoned that the device had "caught" the
words before they entered the wire.15 And where a federal agent listened
to the conversation of an extortionist on an extension phone, this was a
hearing after the words had left the wire, and were no longer protected.16
In conflict with the foregoing reasoning, the use of a microphone
11. United States v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Pa. 1939).
12. United States v. Stephenson, 121 F. Supp. 274 (D.C. 1954).
13. United States v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Pa. 1939); United
States v. Palakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940).
14. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
15. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
16. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
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and a recorder at the recipient's telephone could not be distinguished in
principle from a "tap." The court labelled this conduct a "prohibited in-
terception," and the evidence so obtained was inadmissible.
17
The courts have been faced with many varied situations in which
it was necessary to determine whether an "interception" had taken place.
For example, a third person who listened at the telephone held by the re-
cipient did not "intercept" the message within the meaning of Section
605.18 Further, a United States Marshal who picked up a telephone
and impersonated the party he had just arrested, had not "intercepted"
the message.19
Conflicting decisions in this area have been rationalized by picayune
factual distinctions. In Goldstein v. United States,20 the defendant could
not prevent the introduction of wire-tap evidence since he was not a
party to the tapped conversation, and a witness who was induced to
testify by the government playing a record of the intercepted conversa-
tion to him, was permitted to testify. A strikingly similar situation arose
in Weiss v. United States,21 but in that case the defendant was successful
in excluding the testimony of a witness likewise induced to testify. The
only difference in these cases is that in the latter the defendant was a
party to the intercepted conversation, while in the former he was not; yet
in principle the cases are not distinguishable.
Perhaps the greatest area of contrariety in the interpretation of "in-
tercept" is encountered in the application of Section 605 to the use of
extension telephones. In United States v. Palakoff,22 the use of an ex-
tension telephone constituted an "interception" within the meaning of the
statute. The same court of appeals, seven years later, reiterated its views
on this subject, a point on which Justice Chase vigorously dissented.a
The lower courts have split in the determination of whether listening on
an extension is prohibited by Section 605.24 Recently, in Rathbun v.
17. United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
18. Rayson v. United States, 238 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1956).
19. United States v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 970 (D.C. 1950).
20. 316 U.S. 114 (1941).
21. 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
22. 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940).
23. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
24. Holding that listening in on an extension with the consent of one of the parties
does not constitute an interception: United States v. White, 228 F.2d 832 (7th Cir.
1956); Flanders v. United States, 222 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1955); United States v.
Pierce, 124 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Ohio 1954); United States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp.
480 (D.C. 1953). Holding the contrary view, that to listen in on an extension
does constitute an interception within the meaning of the statute: Reitmeister v.
Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v. Fallon, 112 F.2d 894
(2d Cit. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940); United States v. Palakoff, 112
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United States,25 the Supreme Court was faced with this problem, and
concluded that the evidence was admissible, two Justices dissenting. It is
interesting to note, however, that the lower court 26 reached the zenith of
"hair-splitting" when it announced that whether the use of an extension
telephone would or would not constitute an "interception" is determined
by the location of the two receivers in relation to the lead-in wire to the
house. In other words, if the wire should attach to the second floor of
a house having phones on the first and second floors, evidence obtained
by listening on the second floor extension would be inadmissible for that
is between the sender and the recipient, but listening on the first would
be condoned.27
It appears that the courts are merely verbalizing to reach their desired
results; if a court is particularly inclined to exclude such evidence, it is
not a difficult task to interpret Section 605 so as to attain this result.
At present, there are no bright prospects for harmony among the courts
in their interpretation of this "weasel" word.
Sender
Another jumping-off point in the courts' struggle with Section 605
has been the word "sender." In the Palakoff2M case, Justice Learned Hand
contended that both parties were alternately senders, and as such, the
consent of both is necessary to satisfy the conditions of Section 605;
one party cannot forfeit the privilege of the other. This view has ap-
parently survived the long years since that decision, for in a recent case,29
the court accepted the notion that both parties to a conversation are
senders, and that Section 605 requires the consent of both.
Though this view may be logical in light of the words of the statute,
it has not generally prevailed. The courts have been satisfied when one
party has consented to the overhearing of the conversation, and the
statute does not expressly require the consent of both senders.3 0 While
F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940). It is interesting to note that the three cases here cited
were decisions of the same court, and in which the views of Learned Hand played
an important role.
25. 355 U.S. 107 (1957). The Court's opinion is apparently greatly influenced
by the fact that there has been an increase of 7,000,000 extension telephones since
1934.
26. 236 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1956).
27. According to R. K. Huston of the Cleveland office of the Ohio Bell Telephone
Company, this opinion reflects a fundamental lack of understanding of the operation
of a telephone. (Personal interview March, 1958).
28. United States v. Palakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940).
29. United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
30. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); United States v. White, 228
F.2d 832 (7th Cit. 1956); Flanders v. United States, 222 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1955);
United States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480 (D.C. 1953).
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the courts have construed and reconstrued this word, a rather strange in-
terpretation was made when wire-tap evidence was offered in an attempt
to impeach a government witness. The court refused to accept the wire-
tap evidence because the witness did not consent to the interception, but
made no mention of the other conversant's consent, nor any mention as
to whether the government witness was the "sender." Even more inter-
esting is the fact that it was not an accused, but only a witness who com-
plained of its introduction.3 1
Perhaps the strangest twist of all occurred in the Reitmeister case.
After concluding that the conduct involved constituted an "interception,"
the court went on to say that for one party to exclaim, in a fit of anger,
"The Hell, use the record,"3 2 constituted authorization within the mean-
ing of the statute.
These are a few of the most troublesome aspects of the language
which appears in the statute. There appears to be an attempt to justify
a given result, often predetermined, by attaching "labels" and engaging
in fictitious classifications to attain this end.
WHAT EVIDENCX IS INADMISSIBLE
Assuming that a "prohibited interception" has occurred, evidence ob-
tained in this manner would be inadmissible if the conversation were in-
terstate or intrastate, although the words of the statute are limited to
interstate and foreign messages. This result is based on the rationale
that the means of communication are interstate even though the particu-
lar message may not be.33 From this reasoning it would appear that a
"private" telephone system, such as is found in a factory, would not fall
under the sheltering wings of Section 605. But a contrary result would
seem to follow if the "private" system were capable of being used to
place outside calls, even though the particular calls were not so placed.
The major problems, however, are not in the admissibility of inter-
state and intrastate messages, but rather in the determination of what
evidence is so tainted with illegality that the mandate of the statute pre-
scribes its exclusion.
In the leading case on this point, the first Nardone3 4 case, it was held
that the intercepted communication itself is clearly inadmissible. In the
second Nardone case, leads obtained as a result of wire-tapping were ex-
cluded because
31. James v. United States, 191 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
32. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 693 (2d Cir. 1947).
33. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939); Massengale v. United States, 240
F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1957).
34. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937).
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. . . to forbid the direct use of [these] methods... but to put no curb on
their full indirect use would only invite the very methods deemed "incon-
sistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty".... The
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court, but that it shall not be used at all."
On this point the courts are in harmony, viz., that not only the con-
versation, but all leads obtained as a result of wire-tapping are inad-
missible. But they have been unable to come to terms as to what
constitutes a "lead" so tainted as to make it inadmissible. For example,
a search warrant, issued on the basis of wire-tap evidence, is illegally
issued and as a result any evidence obtained with the aid of such a war-
rant is the result of a "lead" illegally obtained through the interception
of a communication, and thus inadmissible 36 Where the government
induced a witness to testify by playing a recording of an intercepted
communication in which he participated, this was likewise characterized
as a "lead" so tainted with illegality as to make it inadmissible37
In principle, the wire-tap cases have followed the doctrine of the
Weeks8 s case, a non-wire-tap case, which makes illegally obtained evidence
inadmissible. But the general rule of the Weeks case has a notable
exception, expressed in Burdeau v. McDowel,a that the federal exclusion-
ary rule does not apply to evidence illegally obtained by third persons,
without the participation of the federal government. Such evidence is ad-
missible if turned over to the federal government. The wire-tap cases,
however, do not adhere to this exception to the exclusionary rule. In
Benrti v. United States,4" the court characterizes wire-tapping eviden-
tiary problems as sui generis; such evidence was excluded even though
obtained by state officers without any participation by federal agents.
It is evident from the foregoing, that even though a court may suc-
cessfully clear the hurdle of determining whether given conduct consti-
tutes a prohibited interception, it must still face the difficult task of
determining the separate and distinct problem of its admissibility.
35. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939).
36. United States v. Plisco, 22 F. Supp. 242 (D.C. 1938).
37. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
38. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
39. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
40. 355 U.S. 96 (1957). The Court made no mention of In re Milbourne, 77
F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1935), in which it was held that evidence was admissible, even
though state officers "tapped" the defendant's wire, and on the basis of this informa-
tion, made an illegal search, the fruits of which were turned over to the federal
authorities. The determinative factor appeared to be that none of this was done on
behalf of the federal government, and there was no federal participation. The Ben-
anti case goes one step further, for New York laws authorized the wire-tap.
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WiRE-TAP EviDENcE IN THE STATE CouRTS
By no means do the federal courts have a monopoly on the "hair-
splitting" in the wire-tap evidence field. A recent New Jersey case points
this out lucidly.4 1 There, a switchboard operator left her key open and
overhead a conversation between the defendant and another. At the
trial, the evidence was admitted on the theory that to constitute an "in-
terception" there must be a mechanical interposition; to leave a switch-
board key open does not meet this requirement.
The Supreme Court has definitely settled the question of admissi-
bility of wire-tap evidence in the state courts in Schwartz v. Texas.42
It was determined that although Section 605 prohibits wire-tapping and
divulgence, it does not prescribe a rule of evidence for the state courts,
and the admission of such evidence in state tribunals is not error. Ad-
missibility is to be determined by the individual states.
To date, there has been no litigation in Ohio on this point; in the
event that our Supreme Court should be faced with this issue, its past
conduct would indicate that it will reject the federal exclusionary rule.
This conclusion is reached by an analogy to the Weeks43 case. As stated
before, the federal exclusionary rule as there expounded.- that illegally
obtained evidence is inadmissible- does not impose a rule of evidence
for the state courts.44 In making a decision on the admissibility of evi-
dence obtained by a legal search and seizure, the Ohio Court rejected
the federal exclusionary rule in the leading case of State v. Lindway. s
This was done, notwithstanding an Ohio Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure4 6
It would seem to follow that Ohio would similarly reject the federal
exclusionary rule as regards wire-tap evidence. This view is strengthened
by the fact that Ohio statutory provisions dealing with such intercep-
tions are not as stringent as those in the federal statute. Although "in-
terceptions" and "wire-tapping" are prohibited by our statutes, 47 divul-
gence is prohibited only by an employee of a telephone company.48
In view of the foregoing, it would appear almost certain that Ohio
will reject the federal exclusionary rule.
41. State v. Vanderhave, 47 N.J. Super. 483, 136 A.2d 296 (App. Div. 1957).
42. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
43. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
44. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
45. 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936).
46. OHIo CONST. art 1, § 14.
47. OHIo REv. CoDE § 4931.29; § 4931.99 provides a fine of $50 to $300 and/or
imprisonment of from one to three years for prohibited intercepting or divulging.
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CONCLUSION
The problems created by the enactment of Section 605 and the diffi-
culties in its interpretation in the courts have resulted in a great degree of
uncertainty. Much of this uncertainty can be attributed to the unfor-
tunate choice of language in the statute, but in a large measure it is
due to the "hair-splitting" among the courts as they apply its mandate to
various factual situations.
In the federal ambit, prosecutors cannot be sure which evidence may
be stricken by the courts, and they cannot know, authoritatively, whether
they have sufficient "admissible" evidence to sustain their case. This
leads to much litigation which might have been circumvented. On the
other side of the trial table, the accused cannot be sure what his rights
are in respect to wire-tap evidence offered against him.
Equally important is the uncertainty in the state spheres. One aspect
of the uncertainty in the federal courts has been removed, viz., that wire-
tap evidence is admissible in the state courts, at their discretion. How-
ever, when such evidence is admitted, is the witness who testifies com-
mitting a federal crime, for which he may potentially be prosecuted?
And where, as in the BnantiM case, the wire-tapping was occasioned
under a state court order, has the judge who issued the order to have the
wires tapped participated in the commission of a federal crime for which
he too may be prosecuted?
This problem could be alleviated to some extent, by amending the
troublesome clause of Section 605 by adding:
... except under demand of legal authority, properly exercised.
This would permit the issuance of wire-tapping warrants by both state
and federal governments, and erase some of the ambiguity which has
crept into this field.
Although this may lead to a greater degree of certainty in the wire-
tap evidentiary field, there can be no hope for unanimous acceptance of
this proposal. Traditionally, we have been concerned with the rights of
the accused. It is suggested that too much emphasis has been placed on
this aspect of the problem; that society, too, has some rights in this
respect. Perhaps we should re-evaluate the various factors to be con-
sidered in this determination.
As could be expected, much opposition to such a proposal has come
from the telephone companies. They have adopted the position of Jus-
tice Holmes, in the Olmstead case, that:
Wire-tapping is .. . "dirty business." We are in complete agreement
49. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
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